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In the 
Supreme Court· of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla.intiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIE DIXON, 
Defendant and ~ppellant. 
Case No. 
7215 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State agrees with appellant's statement of facts 
except: 
1. There is no evidence in the record of any discrep-
ancy in the testimony of the witnesses at the trial and at 
the preliminary hearing; 
2. That the witness Vernell Stewart was five years 
of age on February 1, 1948 (the day the offense was com-
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mitted) and would be six years of age in May, 1948 (Tr. 
P. 8). The trial was held April13, 1948; 
3. 'The boy, Vernell Stewart, testified on both direct 
and cross examination of the commission of the crime (Tr. 
P. 12 and 20). 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's argument for reversal is based upon two 
contentions. One, that the witness, Vernell Stewart, be-
cause of his tender years should not have been permitted 
to testify; and, second, there is insufficient evidence of any 
:a1' penetration to constitute the crime of sodomy. We will 
dispell the arguments seriatum. :::fi, 
I. 
The Court properly permitted Vernell Stewart 
·~~! 
to testify. 
Section 104-49-2·(2) U. C. A., 1943, provides: 
"The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
(1) Those who are of unsound mind at the .~tk 
time of their production for examination. 1t! (2) Children under ten years of age, who ap-
pear incapable of receiving just impressions of the 
facts respecting which they are examined, or of ~i1 
relating them truly. G
11 (3) A party to any civil action, suit or pro-
ceeding, and any person directly interested in the I ~ 
event thereof, and any person from, through or ~·1,~. under whom such party or interested person derives ,1 
his interest or title or any part thereof, when the 11 
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I 
claims or opposes, sues or defends, as guardian of 
an insane or incompetent person, or as the executor 
or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any de-
ceased person, or as guardian, assignee or grantee, 
directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or devisee, 
as to any statement by, or transaction with, such 
deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter 
of fact whatever, which must have been equally 
within the knowledge of both the witness and such 
insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such 
witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse 
party so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, 
in such action, suit or proceeding." 
The witness was a boy three months short of six years 
of age, at the time of crime. At the trial he was examined 
by the attorney for the State, for the defense and by Court. 
In such examination, the witness testified that he knew 
what telling a lie was, and that if he told a lie he would be 
"put in jail," that he knew what to tell the truth was, and 
that he would tell the truth (Tr. P. 5 & 6) . 
As to his capability of receiving correct impressions 
and relating them, the Court asked his age, the color of his 
shirt and pants, the name of his father and mother, whether 
he knew whether he would be a good or bad boy if he told 
the truth (Tr. P. 8 & 9). 
Since State vs. Blyth, 20 Utah 378, the rule in this ·state, 
as in other states, has been that where a child is under the 
age of ten, the test is whether the child is capable of receiv-
ing just impressions of facts or of stating them truly~ State 
vs. Morasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 P. 5·71; State vs. MacMillan, 
46 Utah 19; State vs. Z eezich, 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927; 
State vs. Williams, 180 Pac. (2) 551. 
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In this jurisdiction, as stated in the above cited cases, 
and as counsel for appellant concedes, the question of com-
petency of the witness is for trial judge who has the op-
portunity to ob~erve and question the witness. His con-
clusion as to the competency will not be reversed unless there 
has been an abuse of the judicial discretion vested in him as 
trial judge. 
Counsel for the State is impressed with the similarity of 
the case at bar with the case. of State vs. Morasco, supra. 
In that case, the witness was between five and six years 
of age. The questions propounded to that witness and the 
answers are remarkably similar to the questions and answers 
in this case. (See P. 7 of 42 Utah.) The Court in that case 
held that the witness was competent; in that case, also, the 
Court gave a cautionary instruction, referred to by the 
Court at page 9 of 42 Utah. Instruction No.5 in the instant 
case is a cautionary instruction given to the jury by the trial 
judge. 
We submit that under the authorities and the facts in 
; 
this case, the Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 
Vernell Stewart to testify. 
II. 
The evidence supports the coJ!clusion that there was 
penetration sufficient to prove the crime of sodomy. 
As in the crime of rape, any penetration, howev·er slight, 
is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Weaver vs. Territory, 
127 P. 724 (Ariz.). 
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In the case at bar, V ernell Stewart both on direct ex-
amination and on cross examination testified that at the 
instigation of the defendant, he "sucked it a little." At Page 
12 of the Transcript: 
"Q. What happened after he asked you to suck 
his pee pee? 
"A. The kids come here, and he · holded the 
door shut so I couldn't get out, and the kids trying to 
push the door open. And -so they opened the door. 
And they went in the bathroom, and he took me 
around the corner, and made me pee pee. He wanted 
me suck his pee pee a little and I sucked it a little. 
"Mr. Shields: I didn't get that last statement. 
"The Court: He said 'I sucked a little.' 
"A. And I went back into the free show. 
"Q. Vernell, what did you suck? 
"A. His pee pee. 
"Q. . How were you-were you standing up, · 
sitting down, or what were you doing when you were 
doing that? 
"A. Standing up. 
"Q. Did he say anything to you when you were 
doing that? 
"A. Unh-uh. 
"Q. Did you see his pee pee? 
"A. (Witness nodded head in the affirmative.) 
"Q. Do you have a pee pee yourself? 
"A. (Witness nodded head in the affirmative.) 
"Q. Where is it? Could you point to it, where 
it is? 
"A. Right here (indicating). 
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"Mr. Johnson: May the record show he is point- ~~ 
ing to his privates? :tn1 
"The Court: The record may so show." :m 
On cross examination, counsel unsuccessfully endeav-
ored to have the witness contradict his testimony, (P. 16 & 
17 of Tran~cript) but received again the statement of pene-
tration ('Tr. P .. 20) : 
"Q. Then what happened, and will you tell us 
where? 
"A. Then he wanted me suck my pee pee for 
a dime. 
"Q. Where did he go-come over here where 
you were? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. So he wasn't holding the door, was he?. 
"A. No, not then. When we got through of it, 
then he hold the door. 
"Q. What? 
"A. When I suck his pee pee, then he shut the 
door. 
"Q. That is after you did it, then he went back 
and held the door; is that it? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. How did he hold the door? Did he stand 
against it, or put his hand against it? 
"A. Standed against it." 
Thus we have the direct evidence of the act itself, 
corroborated and sustained by the testimony of the three 
witnesses, Webb, Smith and Harris, who though not seeing 
the act, placed the defendant on the scene at the time of the 
~ir 
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offense. Further, though not alarmed, as counsel for de-
fendant says, nevertheless, they testified to circumstances 
corroborating the com~ission of the act; to wit, the blocked 
door to the lavatory (Tr. P. 33, 40, 49, 54, 64, 65, 70), with 
the defendant and Vernell Stewart inside; the boy, Vernell, 
spitting and wiping his mouth (Tr. P. 35, 52, 60 & 66). 
In conclusion, we quote from State vs. M orasco, supra, 
page 13 and 14: 
"We think the evidence amply justifies the ver-
dict. 
"The contention that the discrepancy in the 
boy's testimony renders it unworthy of belief is un-
tenable. The discrepancy, in so far as it relates to 
the facts and circumstances immediately connected 
with and surrounding the commission of the crime 
charged, is more apparent than real. The persistency 
with which counsel for defendant objected to prac-
tically every question asked the boy on his direct ex-
amination and the prolonged, searching, and rigor-. 
ous cross-examination to which the child was sub-
jected might well have confused and bewildered a 
much older and more experienced person. There is 
not a circumstance or incident of the trial referred 
to in the record that even suggests that the boy was 
in any sense a designing witness or that he had been 
coached or instructed as to what his testimony should 
be. His answers were frank and artless, and showed 
entire candor on his part. His testimony showed 
that he did not have the slightest conception of the 
revolting character of the assault. In fact, his tender 
age precludes any inference that he knew or should 
have known that the defendant's conduct, as he re-
lated it, was anything more than a mere impropriety. 
Therefore his testimony that he entertained no ill 
feelings toward the defendant, but that he "liked" 
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him, does not necessarily weaken or neutralize the 
effect of his evidence wherein he describes the de-
fendant's conduct-what he did in making the al-
leged assault. 
"The court, as we have pointed out, instructed 
the jury that they should, because of the boy's tender 
years, examine his testimony with care and caution. 
Thus the defendant's rights in this regard were fully 
protected." 
We submit the verdict· should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General 
HERBERT F. SMART, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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